Gottesman and Chuang Quantum Digital Signature: Difference between revisions

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*'''Relevant Network Parameters:'''
*'''Relevant Network Parameters:'''
*'''Benchmark values:'''
*'''Benchmark values:'''
==Use Case==
Online Transactions, Signing Marksheets


==Example:==  
==Example:==  
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===Properties===
===Properties===
----
----
*The protocol-
**involves three parties (Seller, Buyer, Verifier) exchanging one-bit classical messages.
**'''Requires''' quantum one-way function, quantum memory, [[authenticated]] quantum and classical channels
**assumes maximum number of participating parties are honest. In the present case at least two parties are honest.
**provides information-theoretic security
**provides security against repudiation, i.e. the probability that seller succeeds in making buyer and seller disagree on the validity of her sent quantum signature decays exponentially with L, as stated by the formula {equation}
**provides security against forgery, i.e. any recipient (verifier) with high probability rejects any message which was not originally sent by the seller herself. Forging probability is given by the formula, {equation}
===Pseudo Code===
===Pseudo Code===
----
----
*'''Notations Used:'''
*'''Notations Used:'''
**L: Length of keys used
==Relevant Papers==
**<math>s_a</math>: Threshold value for signing
**<math>s_v</math>: Threshold value for verification
**<math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>: Quantum Public key for message k 
**<math>\{\beta^k_1,...,\beta^k_L\}</math>: Classical Private key for classical one-bit message k
**<math>\beta^k_l</math>: Classical description of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>
**<math>B^m</math>: Buyer's Eliminated Signature for message m
**<math>V^m</math>: Verifier's Eliminated Signature for message m
**<math>b^k_l</math>: Buyer’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>
**<math>v^k_l</math>: Verifier’s random bit to determine the measurement basis of <math>l^{th}</math> qubit in <math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>
**<math>m_{b^k_l}</math>: measurement outcome of <math>b^k_l</math>
 
<u>'''Stage 1'''</u> Distribution
*'''Input''' L
*'''Output''' Seller: <math>\{\beta^0_1,...,\beta^0_L\},\{\beta^1_1,...,\beta^1_L\}</math>; Buyer: <math>B^0,B^1</math>; Verifier: <math>V^0,V^1</math>
**'''Key Distribution:'''
#For k = 0,1
## Seller prepares quantum public key <math>|\psi^k\rangle=\bigotimes^L_{l=1}|\beta^k_l\rangle</math>, where <math>\beta^k_l\in_R \{0,1,+,-\}</math>
## She sends Buyer (k,<math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>)
## She sends Verifier (k,<math>|\psi^k\rangle</math>)
**'''State Elimination:'''
#For k = 0,1
##For l = 1,2,...,L
### Buyer chooses <math>b^k_l \epsilon_R {0,1}</math>
###If <math>b^k_l=0</math>, Buyer measures his qubit in X basis <math>\{|+\rangle,|-\rangle\}</math>
###If <math>b^k_l=0</math>, Buyer measures his qubit in Z basis <math>\{|0\rangle,|1\rangle\}</math>
###'''return''' <math>m_{b^k_l}</math>
###<math>B^k_l=1-m_{b^k_l}</math>
 
**Verifier repeats steps 2(a)-2(b) with randomly chosen basis <math>v^k_l</math> to get his eliminated signature elements <math>V^k_l</math>
 
**'''Symmetrisation'''
##For k = 0,1
### Buyer chooses I<math>\subset_R\{1,2,...,L\}, |I|=[L/2]</math>
### <math>\forall i\epsilon I</math>, Buyer sends Verifier <math>(k,i,b^k_i,B^k_i)</math>
### Verifier chooses J<math>\subset_R\{1,2,...,L\}, |J|=[L/2]</math>
### <math>\forall j\epsilon J</math>, Verifier sends Buyer <math>(k,j,v^k_j,V^k_j)</math>
### <math>\forall j\epsilon J</math> Buyer replaces <math>B^k_l=V^k_l</math>
### <math>\forall i\epsilon I</math> Verifier replaces <math>V^k_l=B^k_l</math>
 
<u>'''Stage 2'''</u> Messaging
*'''Input''' Seller: Message m, Private Key for m: <math>\{\beta^m_1,...,\beta^m_L\}</math>
*'''Output''' Buyer: accept or abort, Verifier: accept or abort
**'''Signing:''' ’mismatch’ is when Buyer finds an eliminated signature element in Seller’s private key
# Seller sends Buyer (m,<math>\{\beta^m_1,...,\beta^m_L\}</math>)
# For l = 1,2,..,L
##Buyer counts the number of mismatches (<math>B^m_l=V^m_l</math>) and returns <math>S_b</math>
# If <math>S_b < s_aL/2</math>, Buyer accepts m else he aborts
**'''Transfer'''
# Buyer sends Verifier (m,<math>\{\beta^m_1,...,\beta^m_L\}</math>)
# For l = 1,2,....,L
##Verifier counts the number of mismatches (<math>V^m_l=B^m_l</math>) and returns <math>S_v</math>
# If <math>S_v < s_vL/2</math>, Verifier accepts m else he aborts
 
==Discussion==
*Theoretical Papers
*Theoretical Papers
# [https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105032 GC-QDS (2001)] uses [[quantum one way function]] f(); Private keys: classical input x, Public keys: quantum output f(x). '''Requires''' quantum memory, quantum one way function, authenticated quantum and classical channels, [[SWAP Test]] (universal quantum computer). [[Unconditionally Secure]]
# [https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0105032 GC-QDS (2001)] uses [[quantum one way function]] f(); Private keys: classical input x, Public keys: quantum output f(x). '''Requires''' quantum memory, quantum one way function, authenticated quantum and classical channels, [[SWAP Test]] (universal quantum computer). [[Unconditionally Secure]]

Revision as of 15:47, 11 November 2018

Functionality Description

Digital Signatures (QDS) allow the exchange of classical messages from sender to multiple recipients, with a guarantee that the signature has come from a genuine sender. Additionally, it comes with the properties of (i) transferability i.e. messages with DS can be forwarded from one recipient to another such that DS is verifiable to have come from the original sender, (ii) non-repudiation i.e at any stage after sending the message to one recipient, sender cannot deny having sent the message and corresponding DS, and (iii) unforgeability i.e. a dishonest recipient cannot alter or fake the sender's DS and forward it to other recipients successfully.
Such protocols require parties to store quantum states for comparison at a later stage. For simplicity, most protocols take into account the case of one sender and two recipients (Seller, buyer and verifier) exchanging single-bit classical messages.

Tags: Multi Party (three), Quantum Enhanced Classical Functionality, Specific Task, Quantum Digital Signature, Prepare and Measure Quantum Digital Signature, Measurement Device Independent Quantum Digital Signature (MDI-QDS)

Requirements

  • Network Stage: Quantum Memory
  • Relevant Network Parameters:
  • Benchmark values:

Example:

Outline

Quantum Digital Signature (QDS) protocols can be separated into two stages: the distribution stage, where quantum signals (public keys) are sent to all recipients, and the messaging stage, where classical messages are signed, sent and verified. Here, we take the case of three parties, one sender (referred to as seller) and two receivers (buyer and verifier) sharing a one bit message. Distribution phase can be divided into the following steps:

  • Key Distribution:
Figure

Similarly, Messaging Phase is divided into the following steps:

  • Signing:
  • Transfer:

Properties

Pseudo Code

  • Notations Used:

Relevant Papers

  • Theoretical Papers
  1. GC-QDS (2001) uses quantum one way function f(); Private keys: classical input x, Public keys: quantum output f(x). Requires quantum memory, quantum one way function, authenticated quantum and classical channels, SWAP Test (universal quantum computer). Unconditionally Secure
  2. ACJ (2006) discusses coherent states comparison with a QDS scheme outlined in the last section. Protocol uses the same protocol as (2) but replaces qubits with coherent states, thus replacing SWAP-Test with Coherent State Comparison. Additionally, it also requires quantum memory, authenticated quantum and classical channels, multiports. Unconditionally Secure
  3. SWZY (2017) Discusses an attack and suggests corrections on existing QDS scheme using single qubit rotations. Protocol uses rotation, qubits, one-way hash function; Private keys: angle of rotation, Public keys: string of rotated quantum states. Requires random number generator, one-way hash function, quantum memory, key distribution. Computationally Secure
  • Experimental Papers
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