Travelling Ballot Based Protocol: Difference between revisions

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This type of protocol is subject to double voting and privacy attacks when several voters are colluding.
This type of protocol is subject to double voting and privacy attacks when several voters are colluding.
* Double voting: A corrupted voter can apply the “yes” unitary operation many times without being detected.
* Double voting: A corrupted voter can apply the “yes” unitary operation many times without being detected.
* Privacy attack: An adversary that corrupts voters <math>V_{k−1}</math> and <math>V_{k+1}</math> can learn how voter <math>V_k</math> voted with probability 1.
* Privacy attack: An adversary that corrupts voters <math>V_{k-1}</math> and <math>V_{k+1}</math> can learn how voter <math>V_k</math> voted with probability 1.
 
==Protocol Description==
 
 
==Further Information==
 
<div style='text-align: right;'>''*contributed by Sara Sarfaraz''</div>

Revision as of 06:33, 10 February 2021

This example protocol implements the task of [[Quantum Electronic Voting| Quantum E-voting. The protocol uses two entangled qudits, one as a blank ballot that travels from voter to voter and the second one for computing the election result. The first quantum scheme in this category was introduced by Vaccaro and later improved.

Assumptions

Outline

We consider N voters who wish to cast their vote secretly. The election authority prepares an entangled state, keeps one of the qudits, and passes the other one as the ballot qudit. Each voter receives the ballot qudit from the previous voter, casts her vote by applying a unitary and then forwards the qudit to the next voter. In the end, the authority obtains the election outcome by measuring the two qudits.

Notations

  • voter
  • c: number of possible candidates
  • N: number of voters
  • vote of voter
  • T: election authority
  • m: number of yes votes

Requirements

  • Quantum channel for qudit communication
  • Qudit Measurement Device for election authority
  • Quantum memory to store qudits

Properties

This type of protocol is subject to double voting and privacy attacks when several voters are colluding.

  • Double voting: A corrupted voter can apply the “yes” unitary operation many times without being detected.
  • Privacy attack: An adversary that corrupts voters and can learn how voter voted with probability 1.

Protocol Description

Further Information

*contributed by Sara Sarfaraz